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ABSTRACT 
Households have different means to provide in their need 
for services. In general a household can produce a service 
itself, or buy it on a legal market or illegal market. 
This article investigates the choices made by Dutch house-
holds with respect to three services: small home repairs, car 
repair and maintenance, and ladies hairdressing. The analysis 
showes that the most important determinants of choice are 
family-income, age and education of the bread-winner, degree of 
urbanization of the residence and a do-it-yourself inclination. 
These determinants especially influence the choice between 
legal market provision on the one hand and illegal market 
provision or home production on the other hand. The only deter-
minant with a distinct discriminating effect between illegal 
market provision and home production of services is the do-it-
yourself inclination of the household. 
The author wishes to thank the Organisation for Strategie 
Labour Market Research (OSA) in The Hague, The Netherlands, for 
the use of the data and for its financial support. He also 
thanks the Stichting voor Economisch Onderzoek (SEO) for the 
use of LOGITJD. Last but not least the author wishes to thank 
F. den Butter and A. Hagenaars for their comments and E. 
Gerritsen for her assistance with the computations. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Most of the empirical research on household production-
or home production as it is also called - is on a macro-
economie level, using time budget data. (See for an overview: 
Hawrylyshyn, 1976 and for an example of a recent study: 
Schettkat, 1985). The literature gives only a few examples of 
micro-economie studies of household production (Gronau, 1980). 
Research focusses on changes in time spent on household 
activities. Increasing time spent at home indicates that market 
activities have become less important and vice versa. Thus 
conclusions are drawn about shifts between household production 
and the market sector. 
These shifts are especially interesting with respect to 
services. Private services sold on the market have shown a fast 
growth in the past decades, strongly induced by the growth of 
private incomes. The growth of the service sector led some to 
belief in a coming post-industrial society (Bell, 1973). There 
is however an important counterforce: the unbalanced 
productivity growth. Because the rate of labour productivity 
growth is low in service sectors the price of services in 
relation to goods has risen and will continue to rise in the 
future. In combination with the availibility of ever improving 
consumer durables this may lead to an increasing home 
production (Gershuny, 1983) and a growth of illegal market 
provision by the so called hidden economy. On an illegal market 
services are sold at a price substantially lower than on the 
legal market. The price-reduction on the illegal market is 
achieved by means of tax evasion: no Value Added Tax, Income 
Tax or other taxes are paid. 
Demand for services does not disappear but expensive 
private services are replaced by self service activities (-
ToffIer, 1980) and illegal market provision. At the moment 
market services and equivalent self-service activities go side 
by side and one may wonder if the shifts mentioned will ever be 
completed. 
This article does not deal with changes in choices of 
households over time, but with differences in choice households 
make at a specific moment in time. The main question of this 
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article is: why do some households produce services themselves 
and do other households buy them on the market? Using data of 
about 2000 Dutch households choices are analysed with respect 
to small home repairs, car repair and maintenance, and ladies 
hair dressing. Some households produce these services 
themselves while others buy them on a legal or an illegal 
market. 
This article is set up as follows. In section 2 the 
characteristics of household production and illegal market 
provision are briefly discussed. Also attention is given to the 
choices of households with respect to the modes of provision of 
their services from a theoretical point of view. In section 3 
the data from the April 1985 Dutch household survey used in the 
analysis are described. In this survey households were 
questioned about their legal and illegal market provision of 
services and their do-it-yourself activities. In section 4 
household choices are modelled. It is shown that the cost-
minimizing behaviour of the households under certain 
assumptions leads to a multinomial logit model. In the logit 
model four alternatives are distinguished: legal market provi-
sion, illegal market provision, home production and a 
combination of legal market provision and home production. 
Furthermore the variables used in the analysis are discussed. 
The estimation results from the multinomial logit model and 
other results of the analysis are presented in section 5. The 
conclusions are drawn in section 6. 
2. CHOICES OF HOUSEHOLDS 
2.1 Household production and illegal market provision 
The theory of household production integrates the theory 
of the consumer with that of the firm. Households are cost-
minimizing and utility maximizing units. In Beckers' article a 
household is considered to be a small factory which 'combines 
capital goods, raw materials and labour to clean, feed, 
procreate and otherwise produce useful commodities', in short: 
households produce basic commodities combining time and market 
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goods (Becker, 1965). 
According to the theory of household production, a 
household maximises a utility function - consisting of a vector 
of market goods and a vector of time inputs used in the 
production of the commodities - subject to a goods constraint 
as well as a time constraint. A household produces an optimal 
combination of commodities following a two stage optimization 
procedure. In the first stage short run costs of production are 
minimized subject to the budget and time constraint facing the 
household, which leads to a production possibility frontier. 
Given this production possibility frontier in the second stage 
the household chooses the combination of commodities that 
maximizes utility (Deaton and Muellbauer, 1983). 
The two main features of the theory of household 
production are the incorporation of time as a major determinant 
of household choices and the separation of the consumption 
aspects from the production aspects of household behaviour 
(Gronau, 1986). 
In recent years there has been a lot of discussion about 
the economie value of household production. The main topics in 
this discussion are twofold. The first concerns the definition 
of household production: which activities can be considered as 
productive and which not? The second topic is how the economie 
value of these productive activities can be calculated. 
The discussion about the definition of household 
production is mostly about the distinction between work and 
leisure activities. According to Hawrylyshyn (1977) household 
production is restricted to those activities performed within 
the household by one of its members producing indirect utility 
and which could be done for pay by someone not belonging to the 
household. With these two elements - indirect utility and the 
ability of delegation - it is possible to draw a distinction 
between work and leisure, and work and biological needs. 
According to Hill (1979) an activity is productive if it can be 
performed by a unit distinct from the one who consumes the end 
result. So the essential criterium for a productive activity is 
the existence of a market alternative. 
The second topic in the discussion on household production 
concerns the money value of it. Two approaches use time spent 
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on household production, a third approach uses the price of 
equivalent goods and services available on the market. In the 
forgone expense-approach the value of household production 
equals expenditures saved by performing household work oneself. 
In the forgone wage approach the value of household production 
equals the money income that would be earned if instead of 
spending time on unpaid household work work was done on the 
market for a wage. In the market approach the value of unpaid 
household labour equals the price of equivalent goods and 
services available on the market minus the value of inter-
mediate consumption and fixed capital consumption (household 
durable equipment). Thus the net added value by unpaid 
household labour can be calculated (Chadeau, 1985). 
So there are various methods to establish the value of 
household production. The problems with them are twofold: lack 
of adequate data and a wide range of outcomes depending on the 
method used. This means that although the economie significance 
of some household activities is no longer denied, empirical 
work based on the household production theory is scarce. The 
theory is mostly used as an analytical tooi and only rarely as 
a guide-line in empirical studies (Gronau, 1986). 
Illegal market provision of services is part of the so 
called hidden economy. There are many definitions and descrip-
tions of this phenomenon. A useful one is where the hidden 
economy is defined as that part of the economy where hidden 
income is generated. Hidden income is income that is not 
reported to the tax office, or to the institutions responsible 
for the payment of social benifits, while there is a formal 
obligation to do so. Part of the hidden income is generated by 
hidden labour. There are two main types of hidden labour (Van 
Eek and Kazemier, 1988): 
- Independent hidden labour, which involves the informal paid 
activities by individuals for other individuals. Such acti 
vities include hairdressing, domestic service, removals, 
plumbing, painting and car repair. People involved in auto 
nomous hidden labour will often have as their customers, 
relatives, friends, neighbours and other acquaintances. 
- Hidden labour involving enterprises, which includes work of 
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individuals for enterprises. This work may be done with or 
without a formal labour contract. Examples of the first sub 
category are unreported overtime or other partial registra 
tion of the working time of a formally registered employee. 
Examples of the second subcategory are home work, recruited 
labour in construction, peak time assistance in the retail 
trade or in cafés and restaurants. 
Illegal market provision of services relies of course on 
independent hidden labour. So the illegal market for services 
is only a small part of the hidden economy. There are mainly 
two reasons why consumers rely on illegal markets rather than 
on legal markets: costs and time (Lambooy and Renooy, 1985). 
Services from the illegal market are cheaper than those from 
the legal market. Illegal provided services are especially 
those which have gone up in price rapidly, because of the 
labour-intensive character of the production. High income 
taxes, social premiums and value added taxes which have to be 
paid on the legal market are evaded on the illegal market, 
which reduces the prices substantially. Time also influences 
the use of illegal markets. The use of legal markets is of ten 
restricted to 'office hours'. For people with a job this can be 
problematic, because their working time coincides to a large 
extent with the time in which they have to use legal market 
services. This may urge people to search for supply of services 
on off-office hours like evenings or saturdays. The illegal 
market is excellently capable to supply these services, because 
hidden labour is not restricted to specific working-hours. 
Generally research of the hidden economy is not easy. One 
of the main problems is the illegal nature of the transactions. 
People often are not willing to share information about illegal 
activities with an interviewer. In the case of illegal market 
services however this may be a smaller problem because the user 
of illegal services is not punishable by law. 
2.2 A theorv for the provision of services 
In the traditional household production model a household 
chooses an optimal combination of time and goods to produce 
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commodities. The result of the optimization process is a large 
number of commodities for the household to consume. In this 
article the choice of a household with respect to a specific 
service is analysed. A household is in need of a service and 
is confronted with the choice between buying a service or 
producing it itself. 
Let us consider this choice by means of figure 1, which 
deals with the choice between home production and legal market 
provision, as if there is no illegal market. Figure 1 specifies 
legal market provision and home production in number of hours, 
we abstract from cost of materials and equipment used in the 
production process. The convex curve AB represents an isoquant, 
so it consists of combinations of hours of legal market 
provision and hours of household production with which the 
household gets an equal volume of a service of a specific kind, 
for example a service in car repair and maintenance. The curve 
AB represents the technical rate of substitution, the rate at 
which home production hours can be substituted for market 
production hours while maintaining a constant level of service 
production. 
The extreme s on the isoquant are A and B. In A the 
household does the job completely itself, using OA hours. In B 
the household completely relies on a garage, which needs OB 
hours to do 
Figure 1 The choice between legal market provision and 
home production 
Home 
production 
(hours) 
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the same job. On the other points of the isoquant the household 
does some parts of the repair itself and uses the services of a 
garage for the rest. 
The line DE with slope 6l represents a constant-cost curve 
of the household showing the equal cost combinations of legal 
market provision and household production resulting in a 
certain amount of the service in question. Of course 5X is 
equal to the ratio of the hour costs: 
CH 
«i - [1] 
in whichs cH = the costs of household production per hour 
cL = the costs of legal market provision per 
hour, for example an hour-rate paid to a 
garage 
The hour-costs of household production depend on the value the 
household attaches to the time. This value may depend on the 
net market wage-rate of the member of the household which 
carries out the household production but will also depend on 
the pleasure or aversion connected with the job. The constant-
cost curve DE represents the economie rate of substitution, the 
rate at which home production hours can be substituted for 
legal market production hours while maintaining constant costs. 
If the volume of the required service is fixed, the 
problem of the household is to find a cost-minimizing point on 
the isoquant. To minimize the costs the household chooses the 
combination of household production and legal market provision 
corresponding to the point where the technical rate of substi-
tution equals the economie rate of substitution, which is the 
point at which the isocost-curve is tangent to the isoquant 
curve. In figure 1 this is point C. 
In many cases the situation in figure 1 will not lead to 
an interior solution but to a boundary solution. If 5 s a A is 
the optimum; if 6 £ /3 B is the optimum. Only when a < 6 < p 
combinations of household production and legal market provision 
are used to produce the service. If isoquant AB is linear, 
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there is always a boundary solution unless the slope of the 
constant-cost curve equals that of the isoquant, in which case 
there is no specifie optimum. 
In general the constant-cost curve is fixed for a 
household. Garages have an hour-tariff cL for their services, 
regardless of the kind of car services they render. The costs 
of household production are constant unless the household 
changes the value of time. The isoquant however depends on the 
scale or the intricacy of the service in question. Legal market 
production has economies of scale which household production 
has not. For difficult jobs a household - lacking the 
sophisticated capital goods of the garage - needs relatively 
more time than the garage needs. For difficult jobs the 
isoquant becomes for example A'B' with slope a' at A'. Because 
a' < a difficult jobs have a smaller probability to be home 
produced and a larger probability to be provided by the legal 
market. This means that there are households which rely on the 
garage for some car repair and maintenance while they produce 
other more simple of these services themselves. 
It is also clear from figure 1 that a rise in garage 
tariffs will lead to more home production. An increase in 
income of the household will lead to more legal market 
provision, because the costs of home production increase. The 
difference between legal market costs cL and net income of the 
household is influenced by the tax rate. When the tax rate 
increases there is a shift in the choice of the household from 
legal market provision to home production. 
As stated before two kinds of market can be distinguished: 
a legal and an illegal market. The same story as for the choice 
between household production and legal market provision holds 
for the choice between legal and illegal market provision and 
can be illustrated in figure 1 replacing home production for 
illegal market provision. The isoquant AB then gives the 
combinations of legal and illegal market provision the house-
hold uses to acquire a certain volume of a service of a 
specifie kind. The slope 62 of the constant-cost curve of legal 
and illegal market provision is equal to ratio of the hour-
costs: 
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C I 
52 = [2] 
in which: ct m the hour-costs of illegal market provision, 
for example an hour-rate paid to an illegal 
jobber plus a fictitious price for the 
moral burden of using an illegal market 
The price of illegal market provision includes a fic-
titious price for the moral burden connected to this kind of 
provision. Like household production the illegal production 
also lacks the sophisticated capital goods of the legal sector. 
Illegal production may have economies of scale, but they are 
smaller than the economies of scale of legal production. More 
difficult jobs thus have a larger probability to be provided by 
the legal market. The major difference between the legal and 
the illegal market price of the service is the tax which is 
included in the legal and excluded in the illegal market price. 
An increase in the tax rate will thus lead to a growth of the 
illegal market. A change in public opinion will also influence 
the illegal market price by means of the fictitious price for 
the moral burden in question. When illegal provision is more 
easily accepted by the public as a common phenomenon the 
illegal market price will decrease and there will be a shift 
from legal to illegal market provision. 
The choice to make which households face is three dimen-
sional. A household can choose between home production, legal 
market provision and illegal market provision as well as all 
the combinations between these three. Which choice it will make 
depends on a great number of determinants: the socio-economic 
position and the preferences of the household, the skills and 
physical conditions of the members of the household, the tools 
they possess, the availability of illegal market services, 
etcetera. 
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3. DATA 
The data used in the empirical analysis are from an April 
1985 survey in which about 2000 households were asked about 
their provision of goods and services. In this article we use 
Information about three services: small home repairs, car 
repair and maintenance, ladies hair dressing. (See for details 
of the survey: Van Ours, Kunnen and De Voogd, 1986 and Van 
Ours, Gerritsen, 1988). For a given period of time preceding 
the interview households were asked whether or not they 
consumed one or more of these services. The reference period 
for small home repairs and car repair and maintenance was 6 
months, for ladies hair dressing it was 1 month. If the 
household used a service it was asked about the way it provided 
for this service: by home production or by buying on a legal or 
illegal market. 
The question of whether or not there was home production 
was formulated by asking if the respondent or one of the other 
members of the household produced the service. It is difficult 
to make a distinction between services provided by the legal or 
illegal market. It is not always clear to consumers wether or 
not they buy the service on an illegal market. There are two 
situations in which one may speak of illegal market provision. 
The first situation is when the consumer does not pay Value 
Added Tax where - according to the law - there should have 
been. The second situation is when the producer of the service 
does not pay income taxes or other taxes and therefore is able 
to reduce his price. In the first situation there is a big 
chance the consumer realises the fact the service provision is 
from an illegal market. In the second situation there is prac-
tically no chance the consumer realises the fact the provision 
is illegal. Even if the consumer recognises illegal market 
provision as such there is a possibility of evasive behavior of 
the respondent: he or she denies the fact that the household 
bought the service on an illegal market. Therefore in the 
survey there were no direct questions referring to illegal 
character of the service provision. In the questions the 
distinction was made between paid services of firms distinct 
from paid services from a > person which was described as a 
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jobber. In this way there is a big chance to locate illegal 
market provision, though we admit there is an arbitrary element 
in this. 
Of course not every question was posed to every household. 
The questions about car repair and maintenance were restricted 
to households in the possession of one or more cars. The ques-
tions about ladies hairdressing were restricted to households 
with one or more females aged 15 years and older. 
The questions were posed as follows: 
Small home repairs 
The first question was whether or not in the past six months 
there were small home repairs, described as repairs of water 
taps, water-pipes, waste-pipes, power-points etcetera. It was 
called household production if it was done by the person ques-
tioned, one of the other members of the household or with the 
help of or by friends or relatives as long as it was done 
unpaid. The small home repairs were considered as bought on an 
illegal market if they were paid for and done by some-one else 
for example a jobber. It was called legal market provision if 
it was done by an offical firm. 
Car repair and maintenance 
The first question was whether or not in the past six months 
one or more cars of the household were repaired or maintained. 
This was called home production if it was done by the person 
questioned, one of the other members of the household or by 
friends or relatives, as long as it was done unpaid. The car 
repair and maintenance was considered as bought on an illegal 
market if it was paid for and done by some-one else, a mechanic 
or a jobber. It was called legal market provision if it was 
done by a garage. 
Ladies hair dressing 
The first question was whether or not the hair of one or more 
of the females in the household was dressed in the month March 
1985. It was called household production if this was done by 
the person questioned, one of the members of the household, or 
by friends or relatives. The latter only if it was done unpaid. 
The hairdressing was considered as bought on an illegal market 
if it was paid for and done by a so-called home-barber. The 
hairdressing was called legal market provision if it was done 
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at a barbershop. 
We have no information about the number of times a 
household used a service in the reference period: we only know 
whether or not a service was used. Because we used a reference 
periode for asking back, combinations of modes of provision are 
possible. If a household uses different modes of provision in 
the reference period we cannot make a distinction between the 
cases in which in the reference period the household used two 
or more services on different occasions, choosing different 
modes of provision depending on the scale of the service, and 
the case in which the household used only one service but in a 
combination of two (or more) modes of provision. For example: 
we cannot make a distinction between the case in which a 
household had a car repair by an offical garage one month and 
by one of the members of the household - maybe because it was 
only a small repair - a month later and the case in which the 
car was repaired by an offical garage in combination with some 
small repairs by one of the members of the household. The 
implications of this are discussed in section 4.1. 
Starting from three separate modes of provision we have 
seven possible ways in which a household can provide for 
services in a certain period of time. 
Table 1 Choices of households (percentages)3) 
Choice in mode of provision 
(%) Total 
L H I LH LI Hl LHI Total (numbers) 
Small home repairs 19 66 4 7 1 2 1 100 580b) 
Car repair/maintenance 54 20 8 11 3 3 1 100 1116c) 
Ladies hair dresssing 54 12 13 16 1 3 1 100 915d> 
a) L=legal market provision; H=home production; I=illegal 
market provision 
b) Total number of households in the sample: 2126 
c) Only households in the possession of one or more cars; total 
in the sample: 1531 
d) Only households with one or more females of age 15 years and 
older; total in the sample: 1546 
12 
From table 1 it appears that 27% of the households had small 
home repairs, 73% of the households with one or more cars used 
a car repair and maintenance service, while 59% of the 
households with one or more females of age 15 years and older 
used a ladies hair dressing service. 
Table 1 also contains information about the choices the 
household made with respect to the services in question. From 
this table we see that small home repairs are mostly done by 
home production, whereas car repair and maintenance and ladies 
hair dressing are mostly provided for by legal market 
provision. Illegal market provision is rather large for ladies 
hair dressing. The combination of home production and legal 
market provision is also used by many households. The other 
four possible combinations are rarely used. 
Because the combinations of legal + illegal market provi-
sion, as well as home production + illegal market provision and 
the combination of the three possible modes of provision are 
rarely used, they were skipped from the analysis. In the 
analysis four modes of provision are distinguished: legal 
market provision, home production, illegal market provision and 
the combination of legal market provision and home production. 
After discarding households with combinations of modes of 
provision not analysed and discarding households for which 
essential variables were missing the following samples 
remained: 426 households consuming small home repair services, 
846 households consuming car repair and maintenance services 
and 665 households consuming ladies hair dressing services. 
4. ANALYSIS 
4.1 Modelling household choices 
According to table 1 four alternatives were used 
regularely by households to provide for their services: home 
production (H), legal market provision (L), illegal market 
provision (I) and the combination of legal market provision and 
home production (LH). The theory presented in section 2.2 
suggests that these choices indicate that the isoquants are 
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linear or almost linear combinations of the different modes of 
provision. If this is the case the choice of a household is 
determined by the ratio's of the hour costs and the slopes of 
the isoquants, which themselves depend on the scale of the 
service in question. 
As was discussed in section 3 our data do not contain 
information about the number of times and the amounts at which 
the different modes of provision for the services where used. 
We only know whether or not a mode of provision was used in a 
specific time interval. 
Using a discrete choice model to analyse these choices is 
possible if we consider the combination LH to be a single 
discrete choice and not a combination of two discrete choices. 
In the same way the multinomial logit model is derivable from 
utility maximization (Domencich and McFadden, 1975; Amemiya, 
1981) it is derivable from cost minimization. 
We assume for a household i the costs associated with 
each of the f our alternatives are given by: 
ctj - ^ij + vij [31 
with: j - H, L, 1 or LH 
where pti is a nonstochastic function of explanatory variables 
and unknown parameters and v±i is an unobservable random vari-
able, independent from alternative to alternative. We assume 
that the household chooses the alternative for which the asso-
ciated cost are lowest. So the probability home production is 
choosen is (suppressing the subscript i): 
P(H) - P(CH < CL, CH < Cx, CH < CLH) 
= P(VH+MH-^L < VL' VH+MH-^I < VI» VH+^H"^LH < VLH> IA^ 
Assuming the probability density function of v^  is the Weibull 
f(v1) -= exp(v,).exp(-exp(v1)) it follows from [4]: 
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f VH VH VH+%-^L 
P(H) = J e . exp(-e ).exp(-e ), 
-co 
exp(-e ).exp(-e ) d v„ [5] 
which becomes: 
exp(-yH) 
P(H) = [6] 
exp(-jiH) + exp(-^L) + exp(-jjj) + exp(-jyLH) 
the multinomial logit model with 4 alternatives, in which the 
li's are linear functions of explanatory variables: 
exp(X'/3H) 
P(H) - [7] 
exp(X'/3H) + exp(X'/3L) + expCX»/^) + exp(X'/3LH) 
It is possible that the choice LH consists of two discrete 
choices L and H done by the same household in the reference 
period, because it was confronted with the need to make a 
choice for services of a different scale. So the choice LH may 
represent a discrete choice LH, two discrete choices L and H or 
even a combination of discrete choices LH, L and H. The coeffi-
cients /3LH may thus represent a mixture of different effects. 
4.2 Variables 
In the analysis different explanatory variables are used. 
Most of them are obvious from a theoretical point of view, 
though especially of the influence of some of the variables on 
illegal market provision we have no expectations based on 
theoretical insights. The explanatory variables are the 
following: 
Net familv-income; Theory predicts the higher the income of the 
household the higher the value of time and thus the larger the 
probability of legal market provision and the smaller the 
probability of home production. The consumption possibilities 
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of a household are to a large extent determined by the net 
family-income. If illegal market provision is used as a means 
to save money a negative relation between income and illegal 
market provision is expected. We expect the higher the income 
the larger legal market provision and the smaller home 
production and illegal market provision. 
Family size; Another determinant of the consumption possibities 
of the household is the family size: the larger the household 
the smaller family income per person. We expect larger 
households to compensate for this by saving money and using 
more home production and illegal market provision to provide 
for their services. 
Age; Whether a household is able or unable to home production 
depends amongst others on the physical condition of the members 
of the household. Physical conditions decrease with age, so 
older persons have a smaller ability to carry out home produc-
tion. The illegal market has probably grown especially during 
the last decades. Older persons are less accustomed to this 
phenomenon, have larger moral objections, so we expect a 
negative relation between age and illegal market provision. 
Education: In the legal sector a higher education is connected 
to a higher productivity. Whether this relation holds for home 
production is doubtful. There is no reason to assume a 
university graduate has a greater productivity in repairing a 
car than a person with a secondary level education. The same 
holds for the choice between legal an illegal market provision, 
so we don't have expectations about the relation between 
education and choice in mode of provision. 
Work; In the dataset we used there is unfortunately no infor-
mation about the available f ree time of the households. We 
asume that if one of more members of the household had paid 
vork there was less time available for home production. We 
therefore expect a negative relation between work and home 
production. Using services from a legal market is in many cases 
restricted to office-hours. Especially for people with a job 
this can cause difficulties, because they have to consume these 
services in working hours. In the illegal sector there is more 
flexibility in this, because illegal labour is not restricted 
to office-hours. We therefore expect a positive relation 
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between work and illegal market provision. 
Residence; The place of residence of the household may be an 
important determinant of the choice of mode of provision of the 
services, because of the availability of service-networks. In 
rural areas for example the supply of legal and illegal market 
services will be less abundant than in a city. So we expect a 
positive relation between urbanization and legal as well as 
illegal market services. Lacking the abundant supply of 
services in an urbanizised region in rural areas households 
will have to rely more on home production. 
Do-it-vourself attitude; Whether or not a household can carry 
out home production depends for many services on the 
availability of suitable tools. Households who seldom practice 
do-it-yourself activities have a great possibility of not 
possessing these tools. But households who possess these tools 
still have the opportunity for legal and illegal market 
provision. We consider the possession of suitable do-it-
yourself tools as an indicator for a self-service inclination 
of the household and expect a positive effect of this on home 
production. 
There are two specific explanatory variables, the influence of 
which will be restricted to only one of the services: 
Possessing a house distinct from renting one may influence the 
choice of the household with respect to small home repairs 
though we have no theoretical or other indication of the direc-
tion of this influence. 
Possession of more than one car distinct from possession of 
just one car may influence the choice of the household with 
respect to car repair and maintenance, but again we have no a 
priori-expectations of the direction of this influence. 
The definitions of the variables are shown in Appendix 1, an 
overview of the means of the variables used in the analysis is 
given in Appendix 2. 
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5. ESTIMATION RESULTS 
For the estimations we used the multinomial logit program 
LOGITJD. There are different possibilities to present results 
of multinomial logit analyses. We use the derivates: 
6Pj S 
- Pj ( ^ kJ - S /3kt.Pt ) 18] 
03^ t-1 
with: Xfc = explanatory variable 
j = alternatives L,H,I,LH 
S « the total number of alternatives 
and calculated them in the sample-averages. Because the proba-
bilities add up to 1 the derivates add up to 0: 
S 6Pt 
2 = 0 [9] 
t-1 6Xk 
the influence of the different explanatory variables on shifts 
between alternatives can be derived directly from the 
estimation results, presented in table 2. 
From table 2 it appears that the choices with respect to 
small home repairs are not influenced by family-income, family-
size and urbanization-dummies. There is some influence of age, 
education and work. The strongest influence comes from the do-
it-yourself inclination and the possession of the house dummy. 
Household with a do-it-yourself inclination do more themselves 
and use less legal as well as illegal market services. The 
ownership of a house influences the choice between legal market 
provision and home production. Households owning a house do 
more themselves. 
The choice with respect to car repair and maintenance is 
influenced by many variables. The only variable with no sig-
nificant influence is family-size. Households with a larger 
family-income use more legal market provision for their car 
repair and maintenance and less home production as well as 
illegal market provision. The same holds for households with a 
higher age bread-winner. Level of education and paid working 
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Table 2 Estimation results multinomlal loeit model: derivates 
of probabilities at sample averages 
a. Small bome repairs 
LEGAL HOME ILLEGAL HOME+LEGAL 
INCO 0.12 (1.6) -0.08 (0.9) 0.00 (0.1) -0.04 (0.8) 
SIZE 0.01 (0.7) -0.01 (0.3) 0.00 (0.4) -0.00 (0.7) 
AGE 0.03 (1.6) -0.04 (1.7)* 0.01 (1.6) 0.00 (0.4) 
EDUC 0.02 (0.7) -0.04 (1.5) 0.00 (0.1) 0.02 (1.8)* 
WORK -0.12 (2.0)** 0.12 (1.5) 0.01 (0.4) -0.01 (0.1) 
URB1 -0.12 (1.5) 0.11 (1.2) -0.00 (0.3) 0.01 (0.1) 
URB2 -0.01 (0.1) 0.05 (0.6) -0.03 (1.2) -0.01 (0.1) 
URB3 -0.05 (0.9) 0.10 (1.4) -0.04 (1.6) -0.01 (0.2) 
DIYD -0.23 (5.3)** 0.30 (5.9)** -0.06 (2.7)** -0.01 (0.5) 
HOME -0.15 (3.2)** 0.17 (3.2)** -0.01 (0.5 -0.01 (0.4) 
-Loglikelihood = 329.1 -Loglikelihood baseline = 369.4 
b. Car repair and maintenance 
LEGAL HOME ILLEGAL HOME+LEGAL 
INCO 0.35 (4.6)** -0.28 (4.1)** -0.09 (2.1)** 0.02 (0.3) 
SIZE -0.03 (1.5) 0.02 (1.2) 0.01 (1.1) -0.00 (0.2) 
AGE 0.14 (6.9)** -0.10 (5.9)** -0.02 (1.4) -0.02 (1.5) 
EDUC 0.05 (2.6)** -0.06 (3.0)** -0.01 (0.9) 0.02 (1.4) 
WORK 0.11 (1.6) -0.16 (2.6)** 0.01 (0.1) 0.04 (0.8) 
URB1 -0.14 (2.1)** 0.02 (0.4) 0.07 (1.9)* 0.05 (1.2) 
URB2 -0.18 (3.3)** 0.07 (1.7) 0.07 (2.1)** 0.04 (1.1) 
URB3 -0.10 (1.9)* -0.00 (0.1) 0.06 (1.9)* 0.04 (1.3) 
DIYD -0.17 (4.3)** 0.16 (4.7)** -0.05 (2.4)** 0.06 (2.2) 
CAR -0.20 (3.3)** 0.06 (1.2) 0.04 (1.4) 0.10 (3.1) 
-Loglikelihood = 861.6 -Loglikelihood baseline = 962.5 
c. Ladies hair dressing 
LEGAL HOME ILLEGAL HOME+LEGAL 
INCO 0.22 (3.1)** -0.09 (1.8)* -0.09 (1.8)* -0.04 (0.7) 
SIZE -0.02 (0.9) -0.02 (1.2) 0.02 (1.8)* 0.02 (0.8) 
AGE -0.03 (1.6) -0.01 (0.6) -0.02 (1.6) 0.06 (4.0)** 
EDUC 0.04 (1.7)* -0.02 (1.1) -0.02 (1.3) 0.00 (0.0) 
WORK -0.07 (1.0) 0.01 (0.3) 0.04 (0.8) 0.02 (0.4) 
URB1 -0.11 (1.5) 0.11 (2.6)** 0.03 (0.4) -0.03 (0.4) 
URB2 -0.15 (2.6)** 0.00 (0.0) 0.12 (2.7)** 0.03 (0.8) 
URB3 -0.12 (2.0)** -0.00 (0.0) 0.09 (2.1)** 0.02 (0.6) 
DIYD -0.02 (0.4) 0.04 (1.6) -0.04 (1.7)* 0.02 (0.8) 
-Loglikelihood = 715.9 -Loglikelihood baseline = 758.4 
t-values between parenthesis 
** Significant at 5%-level * Significant at 10%-level 
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discriminate between legal market provision and home produc-
tion. High education of the bread-winner and having one or more 
members of the household on a paid job means less home produc-
tion. The degree of urbanization of the residence appears to 
influence the choice between legal market and illegal market 
provision. Households in rural areas have a smaller illegal 
market provision than households in small or large cities. As 
was expected a do-it-yourself inclination of the household 
stimulates home production at the cost of legal market as well 
as illegal market provision. Households with more than one car 
use more often than households with one car home production in 
addition to legal market provision. 
The choices of households with respect to ladies hair 
dressing are especially influenced by family-income, age of the 
bread-winner and degree of urbanization of the residence of the 
household. A high family-income increases legal market 
provision at the cost of home production and illegal market 
provision. A high age of the bread-winner stimulates the 
combination of legal market provision and home production at 
the expense of the other alternatives. Households in the 
country use more legal market services and less illegal market 
services than households in small and large cities. If the 
household lives in Amsterdam, Rotterdam or The Hague and 
suburbs home production is prefered. Furthermore small 
influences are visible from other variables like family-size, 
education of the bread-winner, and the do-it-yourself 
inclination. The latter variable stimulates home production at 
the expense of illegal market provision. 
To illustrate the effect of the most important 
determinants on the choices households make, we constructed 
three types of households and used the results from table 2 to 
calculate the choices they would make. The three types of 
households differ in family-income, age and education of the 
bread-winner, degree of urbanization and do-it-yourself incli-
nation. Households A and B are low-income households with a 
young and low educated bread-winner living in one of the three 
big cities in the Netherlands. Household B has a do-it-yourself 
inclination which household A has not. Comparing households A 
and B gives the effect of the do-it-yourself inclination. 
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Household C has a high income and a middle-aged, high educated 
bread-winner living in the country without a do-it-yourself 
inclination. 
The calculated choices are presented in figure 2. From 
this figure it appears that household C has a strong preference 
for legal market provision, while for households A and B legal 
market provision is much less important. As far as legal market 
provision is concerned there is not much difference between the 
choices of households A and B. Household B has a preference for 
home production while household A finds compensation for the 
smaller legal market provision by consuming more services from 
the illegal market. 
Figure 2 Calculated choices for three characteristic 
households 
100-
90-
50-
- , — " i " " i " " i " — i — " i " ' i " "i 
A B C A B C A B C 
Hone repair - Car repair - Hair dressing 
• Lesal ESHwie B I l l ega l fflLegaUHoae 
Households (see also: Appendix 1) 
Net family income (gld/month) 
Age bread-winner (years) 
Education bread-winner (CBS-code) 
Urbanization dummy URB1 
Do-it-yourself dummy 
2000 2000 4000 
25 25 50 
2 2 5 
1 1 0 
0 1 0 
Households facing the need for a service seem to choose 
between legal market provision on the one hand and illegal 
market provision and home production on the other hand, a 
choice which is especially determined by family-income, age and 
education. Households who have less monetary restrictions on 
their consumption budgets, who are older and thus less able to 
carry out household production and have a stronger moral 
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objection against illegal market provision and households with 
a higher education have a preference for legal market 
provision. The choice between home production and illegal 
market services depends on the do-it-yourself inclination of 
the household and the availability of illegal market service-
networks. The latter reveals itself because of the stronger 
preference for illegal market provision of households living in 
urbanized areas. 
6. CONCLÜSIONS 
Households have different means to provide in their need 
for services. In general a household can buy a service on a 
legal market market, an illegal market or produce it itself. 
The choices of households to acquire services in a certain way 
do not only have micro-economie consequences regarding the 
allocation of the financial budgets of those households. They 
also contribute to the rise or decline of certain service 
sectors, legal as well as illegal. 
In this article the choices of Dutch households have been 
analysed with respect to three services: small home repairs, 
car repair and maintenance and ladies hairdressing. With three 
single modes of provision and four combinations of these three 
there are seven possible ways in which a household can provide 
for a service. From the survey it appears that only four alter-
natives are use regularely: home production, legal market 
provision, illegal market provision and a combination of home 
production and legal market provision. According to the theory 
of the cost-minimizing household these choices indicate that 
the isoquants of the modes of provision are linear or almost 
linear. 
The analysis was carried out using a discrete choice model 
for which we used a multinomial logit model with the four 
alternatives mentioned above. The analysis showes that the most 
important determinants of choice are family-income, age and 
education of the bread-winner, degree of urbanization of the 
residence and a do-it-yourself inclination. A high family-
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income and a high education of the ma in earner have a positive 
effect on legal market provision and a negative effect on 
illegal market provision and home production. Households in 
rural areas use more services from a legal market and less from 
an illegal market. A high age has a positive effect on legal 
market provision and a negative effect on home production. The 
influence of age on illegal market provision depends on the 
service in question. For small home repairs illegal market 
provision increases with age, though the effect is small. In 
the other categories illegal market provision decreases with 
age. The only determinant with a distinct discriminating effect 
between illegal market provision and home production of 
services is the do-it-yourself inclination. 
The main conclusion of this study is that the choices 
households make with respect to the mode of provision of the 
services they consume is influenced not only by financial 
arguments, but also by the physical condition of the members of 
the household, their skills, the supply of illegal market 
services in the local area, moral objections against the use of 
illegal market services and the inclination of the household 
towards selfservice-activities. More specific conclusions refer 
to the pattern we revealed in the choices of the households. It 
appears that households choose between legal market provision 
on the one hand and illegal market provision or home production 
on the other hand, a choice especially determined by socio-
economic factors. If households don't buy on a legal market 
their choice between home production and illegal market 
provision depends on their selfservice inclination and the 
availability of illegal service-networks in their 
neighbourhood. 
Exaggerating one could say home production is the domain 
of the low budget households, while services from an illegal 
market are bought by low-budget households unable to carry out 
home production. 
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Appendix 1 Definition of variables 
INCOs Logarithm of net family income per month (in 
guilders) 
SIZE: Family size 
AGE: Age of the bread-winner (years/10) 
EDUC: Education of the bread-winner (according to the 
Standard Education Classification of the Central 
Bureau of Statistics; 2 = primary level; 3 » extended 
primary level; 4 = secondary level; 5» higher 
vocational level; 6 «• academie level 
WORK: W0RK»«1 if one or more members of the household has a 
paid job; WORK=0 otherwise 
URB1: URB1=1 if the household lives in Amsterdam, Rotterdam 
or The Hague and suburbs; URB1=0 otherwise 
URB2: URB2=1 if the household lives in a large town; URB2=0 
otherwise 
URB3: URB3=1 if the household lives in a small town; URB3=0 
otherwise 
DIYD: Do-it-yourself dummy; DIYD=1 if the household is in 
possession of 4 or more out of the following 5 
tools:soldering iron, tooi box, volt-meter, electric 
drill, mitre-saw 
HOME: H0ME=1 if the household owns the house which it lives 
in; HOME=0 if the household rents that house 
CAR: CAR=1 if the household owns 2 or more cars; CAR=0 if 
the household owns 1 car 
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Appendix 2 Means of variables used in the analvsis 
2.1 SMALL HOME REPAIRS 
Total sample Legal Home Illegal Home+Legal 
INCO 7.88 7.94 7.87 7.87 7.89 
SIZE 3.29 3.14 3.35 3.25 3.13 
AGE 4.39 4.81 4.27 4.81 4.21 
EDUC 3.52 3.62 3.45 3.56 3.84 
WORK 0.79 0.66 0.82 0.75 0.81 
URB1 0.13 0.12 0.12 0.25 0.16 
URB2 0.34 0.38 0.34 0.25 0.32 
URB3 0.32 0.31 0.33 0.19 0.32 
DIYD 0.64 0.39 0.73 0.31 0.58 
HOME 0.55 0.43 0.59 0.50 0.51 
NUMBER OF 
OBSERVATIONS 426 77 302 16 31 
2.2 CAR REPAIR AND MAINTENANCE 
Total sample Legal Home Illegal Home+Legal 
INCO 7.91 7.97 7.78 7.83 7.96 
SIZE 3.24 3.14 3.36 3.40 3.30 
AGE 4.28 4.56 3.85 4.03 4.00 
EDUC 3.49 3.59 3.20 3.31 3.72 
WORK 0.83 0.78 0.85 0.86 0.91 
URB1 0.12 0.12 0.09 0.14 0.13 
URB2 0.33 0.31 0.36 0.35 0.35 
URB3 0.34 0.34 0.30 0.38 0.36 
DIYD 0.60 0.53 0.75 0.48 0.73 
CAR 0.13 0.11 0.11 0.14 0.25 
NUMBER OF 
OBSERVATIONS 846 471 195 74 106 
2.3 LADIES HAIR DRESSING 
Total sample Legal Home Illegal Home+Legal 
INCO 7.89 7.93 7.79 7.80 7.87 
SIZE 3.21 3.18 3.10 3.47 3.18 
AGE 4.50 4.41 4.45 4.19 5.07 
EDUC 3.39 3.52 3.18 3.20 3.26 
WORK 0.78 0.79 0.77 0.85 0.67 
URB1 0.14 0.14 0.26 0.08 0.11 
URB2 0.33 0.31 0.28 0.41 0.39 
URB3 0.33 0.33 0.29 0.37 0.34 
DIYD 0.56 0.55 0.63 0.50 0.60 
NUMBER OF 
OBSERVATIONS 665 384 76 94 111 
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